Intelligence Shift and Existential Threat
Giora Eiland, former head of the Operations Directorate, Planning Directorate, and National Security Council within the Israel Defense Forces, disclosed new details regarding warnings preceding the October 7, 2023 attacks. In an interview with Ma’ariv’s podcast, Eiland stated that Aharon Haliva, then-head of Military Intelligence, significantly raised his assessment of the probability of a multi-front war during June and July 2023. This marked a sharp departure from the prevailing intelligence estimate as late as December 2022, which had categorized the risk as low.
Eiland explained that Haliva convened a consultative meeting with eight former military officials, including four former heads of Military Intelligence and four former heads of the Operations Directorate, to present this revised threat assessment. Haliva cited two primary drivers for this change: the substantial growth in military capabilities of Iran and allied armed groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Iranian-aligned factions in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. These entities had transformed what was previously described as a “ring of fire” into actual operational capabilities featuring precision weapons and high readiness assault forces, such as Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and Hamas’s elite units in Gaza.
The second factor identified by Haliva was the internal political crisis in Israel stemming from proposed judicial reforms. Eiland noted that this domestic division was perceived as negatively impacting the IDF’s readiness. After reviewing detailed intelligence on Iranian and Hezbollah technological capabilities, Eiland expressed shock at the level of force facing Israel. He concluded that within months, likely by late 2023 or early 2024, Israel could face not merely a regional conflict but an existential war.
Direct Warning to the Prime Minister
Eiland asserted that he personally warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of these dangers. On August 16, 2023, Eiland held a closed-door meeting lasting approximately one hour at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Tel Aviv. During this session, he outlined specific security risks and proposed a compromise to resolve the judicial reform crisis, arguing that internal cohesion was essential for military preparedness. Eiland admitted he may have been “naive” in believing Netanyahu was willing to negotiate, but felt compelled to act given the looming existential threat.
Eiland confirmed that Netanyahu received both intelligence briefings on the heightened war probability and direct warnings about the impact of internal divisions on army readiness. The day after meeting Netanyahu, Eiland spoke with former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who indicated he could accept roughly 80 percent of the proposed compromise. Eiland relayed this message to Netanyahu’s office, but the process stalled. According to Eiland, Netanyahu “heard but did nothing.”
Shared Responsibility
While providing this testimony, Eiland emphasized that it does not absolve Haliva of responsibility for the failures preceding October 7. When asked if he agreed with harsh criticisms directed at the former intelligence chief, Eiland responded affirmatively, noting that Haliva himself shares this view. However, Eiland insisted that accountability extends beyond the security establishment to the political leadership, particularly because these dire assessments reached decision-makers. His account contradicts previous claims by Netanyahu that he lacked clear warnings, aligning instead with reports that Israeli leadership was aware of the escalating threat landscape.
